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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20001085-CA

vs.
RENATO L. BARBOSA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted kidnapping, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-301 (1983) and 76-4-101 (1973),
in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where defendant neither objected to the trial court's jury instructions nor
proffered any instructions of his own, and where the record demonstrates that the
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jury necessarily found each element of attempted kidnapping, did the trial court
commit reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the elements of
attempt?
"This court reviews a trial court's failure to give accurate elements in a jury
instruction under a correctness standard. However, jury instructions to which a
party failed to object will not be reviewed absent manifest injustice." State v.
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
2. Was the evidence so "inconclusive or inherently improbable" that
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant
committed attempted kidnapping, and, if so, was the evidentiary defect "so obvious
and fundamental" that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury? State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346.
Review of defendant's unpreserved insufficiency claim is for plain error. See
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in Addendum A:
§ 76-5-301 (Kidnapping)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (Attempt)
UTAH CODE ANN.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with attempted kidnapping and tried
before a jury. R. 2-3. The jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him
to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R. 99, 102, 105.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 111.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Crime
Defendant, a thirty-year-old male driving his motorcycle on Logan Avenue in
Salt Lake City, stopped fourteen-year-old Joshua Hansen, a stranger, to ask him the
time. R. 12, 117:48-49, 55. When Joshua said he did not know, defendant asked
Joshua whether he had a girlfriend, whether he had sex with his girlfriend, and how
large his penis was. Id. at 49-51. Placing his two index fingers on his leg,
defendant said that his own penis was "this big." Id. at 51. Defendant then asked
Joshua to "[s]how me yours." Id. at 52. He also asked Joshua whether he had a lot
of pubic hair and said "Show me that." Id. at 53. Joshua refused and repeatedly
responded, "It doesn't matter, I gotta go." Id. at 51-53. Defendant also asked
Joshua whether Joshua would like a ride home. Id. at 54. Joshua said, "No, I can
walk." Id.
At that point, defendant put down his kickstand, got off his motorcycle, put up
his hand, and approached Joshua, asking Joshua to "measure hands" with him. Id.
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at 53, 87. Joshua said, "No, I really got to go." Id. at 53. Defendant then reached
down and grabbed Joshua's left arm between the elbow and the wrist and said
"Come with me." Id. at 53-54, 90-94. Defendant began pulling Joshua toward
him, and held Joshua from two to three seconds. Id. Joshua then twisted out of
defendant's grasp and ran away. Id. at 54-58. Defendant did not follow. Id. at 95.
Joshua's parents were driving in their neighborhood, saw Joshua running, and
picked him up. Id. at 114-116. Joshua was upset and said he "was almost
kidnapped." Id. at 116. Joshua's mother testified that she did not give defendant
permission to take her son anywhere. Id.
Kevin Jones, the investigating officer, testified that he prepared a report after
talking to Joshua on the day of the incident. Id. at 100-101. The report included
many of the details to which Joshua testified, but did not include the "come with
me" statement. Id. at 108-111. Defendant's only witness, Detective David Jensen,
who conducted two follow-up interviews with Joshua, reported additional details
not included in Officer Jones's report, but apparently did not record a "come with
me" statement either. Id. at 131-132.
Jury Instruction
After the conclusion of trial testimony, the court instructed the jury.
Instruction 12, included in Addendum B, required the jury to find
that defendant "attempted to detain or restrain Joshua,"
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•

that the "attempted detention or restraint was done intentionally or knowingly,"

•

that the attempted restraint was against Joshua's will and without lawful
authority, and

•

that the "attempted detention or restraint was intended to be for a substantial
period or was without the consent of [Joshua's] parent or guardian."

R. 81. The trial court did not give an instruction on attempt. See R. 72-98.
Defendant did not object to any instruction and did not proffer any further or
different instructions. SeeR. 117:131-144.
During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel explained
that an attempt requires "a substantial step." Id. at 151; 154. Defense counsel also
explained that the "substantial steps [must be] strongly corroborative" of intent to
commit a prohibited act. Id. at 154.
Two theories were presented to the jury. The prosecution argued that
defendant attempted to kidnap Joshua when he grabbed Joshua's arm. Id. at 151.
Defense counsel argued that defendant was merely attempting to get Joshua to
"measure hands" and that Joshua's "come with me" statement was a fabrication.
Id. at 158-160. The jury, finding Joshua's story credible, returned a guilty verdict.
Id. at 167.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Jury instructions adequately detailed the elements of attempted kidnapping.
While the court did not specifically instruct the jury on the meaning of attempt, that
failure did not mislead the jury or contribute to any unfavorable jury finding. On
review, it is clear that the jury necessarily found all of the relevant elements and no
manifest injustice occurred. Under the facts of this case, no reasonable likelihood
exists that the jury would have returned a result more favorable to defendant had an
attempt instruction been given. Failure to give the attempt instruction was not
reversible error.
2. The evidence sufficed to support the verdict. The trial produced evidence
from which the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the requisite elements of
attempted kidnapping.
ARGUMENT
Point I
IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS TRIAL,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ADEQUATELY
DETAILED THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to include an elements
instruction for attempt or to otherwise define attempt for the jury constituted plain
error. Br. Aplt. at 10-11. Failure to give the attempt instruction did not prejudice
defendant. It did not constitute "manifest injustice" and does not require reversal.
6

The State bears the burden of proving the elements of an offense. See State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-501 (1973).
The court must therefore properly instruct the jury on the elements the jury must
find beyond a reasonable doubt. Manifest injustice may occur where, because no
elements instruction is given or because the instruction given is incomplete or
incorrect, the jury may reach a guilty verdict without finding each of the elements
of the offense. See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608-609 (Utah App. 1998);
State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) (noting that "manifest
injustice" was obvious in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991)).
In other cases, however, the error may not be so substantial. While an
instruction may be incomplete or incorrect, the reviewing court can determine that
the jury did find each of the elements of the offense and therefore any error is not
prejudicial. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-1049 (Utah 1984)
(reviewing failure to expressly treat element of knowledge in context of second
degree murder conviction); Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292 (addressing absence of
nonmarriage element in rape instruction).
The distinction between errors that result in manifest injustice and those that
do not is reflected in case law. Where a reviewing court cannot determine whether
the jury found all the elements of the offense, reversal is required. This is
obviously the case where a court completely fails to give an instruction regarding
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the elements of the offense. See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061 (no instruction on
aggravated kidnapping). Similarly, where the court fails to instruct regarding a
crucial element of the offense, where that element is at issue, a reviewing court
cannot determine whether the jury found that element and, again, reversal is
required. See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980) (no instruction on intent
to permanently deprive owner).
On the other hand, where the reviewing court can determine that the jury
found all the elements of the offense, no prejudice—and therefore no manifest
justice—has occurred. Even the failure to define a basic element of the offense
does not always preclude a reviewing court's determination that the jury found all
of the elements of the offense. If the element is not at issue, for instance, failure to
instruct on that issue may not be prejudicial. In Stevenson this Court held that the
trial court's failure to instruct on the nonmarriage element of rape, then an essential
element of the offense, was nonprejudicial. See 884 P.2d at 1292. This Court
observed that "the nonmarriage element of rape was never an issue at trial" and "all
testimony at trial clearly and indisputably established that [the] defendant and [the
victim] were not married." Id.
Further, incomplete and incorrect elements instructions do not always require
reversal. The failure to expressly instruct on the element of knowledge has been
held harmless where
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•

the jury was not misled,

•

even had the instruction been given, the jury could not have avoided finding
the required element,

•

no reasonable likelihood exists that a correct instruction may have produced a
result more favorable to the defendant, and

•

defendant made no request for an instruction on the element.

See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1048-1049 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Knowles, 709 P.2d
311, 312 (Utah 1985) (holding that improper entrapment instruction did not warrant
reversal because evidence of entrapment was sufficiently weak that, even absent
error, defendant had no "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result").
In the instant case, the failure to instruct on attempt was not prejudicial. No
manifest injustice occurred, and the error does not require reversal. The jury was
not misled. The jury could not have avoided finding the attempt element.
Defendant did not object to the instructions or request an instruction on attempt,
and no reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have returned a more
favorable verdict had a correct instruction been given.
Defendant's cited cases are distinguishable. Here, the jury was instructed
regarding the elements of kidnapping, but not regarding the elements of attempt.
This case is therefore unlike Jones, where the trial court gave no instruction at all
on aggravated kidnapping. See 823 P.2d at 1061.
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This case also differs from Laine, where mens rea was a crucial element of the
offense, and the reviewing court was unable to ascertain whether the jury found that
Laine intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property. See 618 P.2d at
35. In the instant case, the issue was not whether defendant "attempted" something.
That was conceded. Defendant attempted something; and, in doing so, defendant
grabbed Joshua's arm, maintaining the grasp until Joshua twisted away.
R. 117:151, 158-160. The issue, rather, was what defendant attempted.
Further, this case also differs from Laine because nothing in the Laine record
suggested that the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property. Here, the record
demonstrates that the jury found the that defendant "attempted" the crime, i.e., that
he committed a "substantial step" "strongly corroborative" of his intent to kidnap.
Only two theories of the evidence were presented here: the prosecution's
theory that defendant grabbed Joshua's arm in an attempt to kidnap and defendant's
theory that he grabbed Joshua's arm in an attempt to "measure hands." The jury
rejected defendant's theory when it found defendant guilty. It necessarily found the
uncontested fact that defendant grabbed Joshua's arm and held him a few seconds.
The jury also drew from the facts the reasonable inference that this act was an
attempt to kidnap, not an attempt to measure hands, and credited Joshua's story that
defendant said, "Come with me."
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The Utah kidnapping statute states that "[a] person commits kidnapping when
he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law and against the will of
the victim" does one of the following acts:
•

"detains or restrains another for any substantial period," or

•

"detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious
bodily injury," or

•

"holds another in involuntary servitude," or

•

"detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian''

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-301 (1983) (emphasis added). The jury was instructed on

these elements. R. 82. The prosecution did not argue that defendant held or
attempted to hold Joshua for a substantial period, exposed or attempted to expose
him to risk of serious bodily injury, or held or attempted to hold him in involuntary
servitude. The prosecution argued only that defendant detained or restrained or
attempted to detain or restrain Joshua, a minor, without consent of his parent. The
elements instruction given to the jury reflected this theory. See R. 81.
In some cases, an act may be a step toward the commission of an offense but
not a "substantial step" or not "strongly corroborative" of the intent to commit the
offense. In the context of this case and under the kidnapping law applicable to its
facts, defendant's act was necessarily a "substantial step" and "strongly
corroborative" of the intent to commit kidnapping. If defendant grabbed Joshua's
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arm even momentarily, he not only attempted, but completed, the crime of
kidnapping. All the law requires is that the restraint or detention of a minor,
however brief, be without his parent's consent. If the jury found that defendant
grabbed Joshua's arm, a fact that it necessarily found under the instructions as
given, the jury found the elements of kidnapping. If the jury found the elements of
kidnapping, a fortiori the jury found the elements of attempted kidnapping,
including a "substantial step" that was "strongly corroborative" of defendant's
intent to commit kidnapping.1
In other words, not only was the element of attempt not at issue, but even had
it been, this jury was not misled. Even had the attempt instruction been given, the
jury could not have avoided finding that defendant attempted to kidnap Joshua.
Under the facts presented and the applicable law, no reasonable likelihood exists
that a correct instruction would have produced a result more favorable to the
defendant.
Defendant argues, nonetheless, that State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 (Utah
1986), controls this case and that the failure to give an attempt instruction requires
reversal, thus precluding analysis of other precedent. The Harmon court did find
the refusal to give an attempt instruction reversible error and reversed a conviction
for attempted robbery. The Harmon decision, however, clearly rested on a failure
1

Further, the actual commission of an offense is not a defense to the offense of
attempt. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(3)(a).
12

to give an attempt instruction in the face of an objection to the instruction given and
the proffer of an instruction on attempt. Id. In the instant case, no objection was
made and no alternative instruction was proffered, and Harmon does not control.
Further, the Harmon court stated that it was "unable to determine whether the
jury properly found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
292. Here, as explained in the foregoing analysis, this Court can determine that the
jury necessarily found each and every element. Where the jury could not have
avoided finding the element of attempt, "in company with the fact that the defense
made no request for an instruction," error in omission of the instruction is not
prejudicial and does not require reversal. Fontana, 680 AP.2d at 1048.2
In sum, although the trial court erred when it failed to give an attempt
instruction, the error did not constitute a complete failure to instruct on the elements
of attempted kidnapping. Further, the element of attempt was not at issue in this
case. Even had it been, the record demonstrates that the jury necessarily found
2

In Harmon, the State faulted defendant for not providing a full trial transcript on
appeal, speculating that the full transcript may have demonstrated that the error was
harmless. 719 P.2d at 292. The court found that the record provided was sufficient to
establish the error claimed. Id. That record demonstrated (1) defendant's objection and
proffered jury instruction and (2) the judge's stated reasons for refusing the instruction.
Id. The court did not have before it a record demonstrating that the jury had found each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the State supplemented the record
and had the record demonstrated that the jury had found each element of the offense, the
Harmon court may have reached a different result, even though an objection had been
made. Harmon could be read to shift the burden to the State to show harmlessness where
the trial court errs in an elements instruction and the defendant objects, thereby preserving
the claim.
13

every element of attempted kidnapping. In view of the nature and quantity of the
evidence in this case, no reasonable likelihood exists that a correct instruction
would have produced a result more favorable to defendant. Defendant did not
object, and no manifest injustice occurred. The error was nonprejudicial and does
not require reversal. No precedent compels a different result.3
Point II
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
sustain the jury's guilty verdict. Br. Aplt. at 15-17. Specifically, defendant argues
that his "grabbing Joshua's arm for two seconds and telling him 'Come with me'
and then letting him go without any threat or harm when Joshua pulled away did
not constitute a substantial step which was strongly corroborative of intent to
kidnap." Id. at 17. Defendant "relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrines in addressing [these] matters for the first time on appeal." Id.
at 18.
Defendant establishes no error. His reliance on plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel is therefore unavailing.

3

Defendant also relies on the "ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine[]" to raise
this unpreserved issue on appeal. See Br. Aplt at 1-2,1 n.2. Because any error was not
prejudicial, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521-522
(Utah 1994).
14

To establish error, defendant must show that the evidence was "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable" that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed attempted kidnapping.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,118 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way,
"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made," this
Court will not reverse. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f67, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 16
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, evidence adduced was sufficient on every element of the crime.
Evidence was adduced at trial that defendant intentionally and knowingly, without
authority of law, and without Joshua's consent, grabbed Joshua's arm and held it
for a few seconds. R. 117: 53-54, 90-94. Evidence was presented that Joshua was
a minor and that defendant did not have Joshua's parents' permission to grab and
detain Joshua. Id. at 55, 116. Any detention of a minor, under these circumstances,
is sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5301. It is necessarily sufficient to support a conviction for attempted kidnapping.
See State v. Garnick, 619 P.2d, 1383, 1385 (1980). Grabbing and holding Joshua,
however momentarily, was an act sufficient to constitute a "substantial step"
"strongly corroborative" of defendant's intent to kidnap.
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The jury also credited Joshua's statement that defendant said "Come with me."
That statement provides additional, although unnecessary, support for the jury's
verdict. The statement and act together even more forcibly demonstrate both an
actual kidnapping and the included "substantial step" "strongly corroborative" of
the attempt to kidnap.
Evidence sufficed to support jury findings on all the requisite elements of
attempted kidnapping, and the trial court did not err in submitting the case to the
jury. Because defendant cannot show error, he cannot demonstrate plain error. He
cannot show any evidentiary defect let alone a defect "so obvious and fundamental"
that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at
f 18. Because the evidence is legally sufficient, defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim also necessarily fails. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f34, 989
P.2d 52 ("failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel").
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on August /_, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
h

f
I

JEANNE B. INOUYE
^Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM "A"

1

PART 3
KIDNAPING
76-5-301. Kidnaping.
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority
of law and against the will of the victim:
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury;
or
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953,76-5-301, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-301; 1983, ch. 88, § 13.

© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved.

1

PARTI
ATTEMPT
76 4 101 Attempt - Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed had the
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
Hisl « >i } i C, 1953, 76- 4 101 < snacti M:I I >> I • 19" 73, ch 196, § 76 4 101

© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group. Allrightsreserved.

ADDENDUM "B"

INSTRUCTION NO.

\1^

Before you can convict the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA,
of

the

offense

of

Attempt

Kidnapping

as

charged

in

tne

information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, RENATO LEITE BARBOSA,
attempted to detain or restrain JOSHUA HANSEN; and
2.

That such attempted detention or restraint was done

intentionally or knowingly; and
3.

That such attempted detention or restraint was against

the will of JOSHUA HANSEN, and without authority of law; and
4.
intended

That

such

attempted

detention

or

restraint

was

to be for a substantial period or was without the

consent of JOSHUA Hansen's parent or guardian.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find

the

defendant

charged in the information.

guilty

of

Attempted

Kidnapping

as

If, on the other hand, you are not

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\3

Under the law of the State of Utah a person commits

the

crime of Kidnapping when that person intentionally or knowingly
and without authority of law and against the will of the victim:

a)

detains

or

restrains

another

for

any

substantial

period; or

b)

detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing
that other person to risk of serious bodily injury; or

c)

hold another in involuntary servitude; or

d)

detains or restrains a minor without consent of that

minor's parent or guardian.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\A

The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting.

Intent, being a state

of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence

and may ordinarily

statements and circumstances.

be inferred

from acts, conduct,

INSTRUCTION NO.

\^>

Intent and motive should never be confused.
prompts a person to act, or fail to act.

Motive is what

Intent refers only to

the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted.
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not
be proven.

The motive

of an accused

is

immaterial

except

insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of
state of mind or intent.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\ ig

You are instructed that a person engages in conduct:
Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.

A

person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\r{

To constitute the crime charged in the information tnere
must be the joint operation of two essential elements:

conduct

prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law.
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was

prohibited

from

committing

the

conduct

charged

in

the

information and that the defendant committed such conduct with
the culpable mental state required for such offense.
"Conduct" means an act or omission.
"Act"

means

a

voluntary

bodily

movement

and

includes

speech.
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal
duty to act and the actor is capable of acting.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\%

The definition of "restrain" is to limit, confine, abridge,
narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, and hinder, to prohibit
from action, to restrict a person's movements in such manner as
to interfere substantially with his/her liberty.

INSTRUCTION NO. \C\
The definition of "detain" is to retain as the possession
of personalty, to delay, to hinder, to hold, or keep in custody,
to retard, to restrain from proceeding, to stay, to stop, to
withhold.
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1 i

A

And he was like do you got a lot of hair down there? |

2 i And I was like "It doesn't matter.

I really got to go." And

j

3 ! he was like, "Well, show me that." And I was like, "No." And
i

4 | then he's like, he put the kick stand down on his bike and he
5
6 |

put up his hand and he's like measure hands.
Q

So, just a second.

7 I down on his bike.

You said he put the kick stand

He asked you all of these questions from his

8

motorcycle?

9

A

Yeah.

10

Q

Okay. And he put the kick stand down and showed you

11

the palm of his hand?

12

A

Yeah.

13

Q

And then what happened?

14

A

And he was like measure hands with me and I was like

15

no, I really got to go. And then he approached me and he

16

grabbed my left arm on my forearm part.

17

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

18 I

A

Right here and I just twisted around.

19 (

Q

Could you show the jury with your own arm where

20 | exactly he grabbed your left arm?
21 i
22 j

A

Right here.
MR. COPE:

Indicating approximately one-third of the

23

way down from the elbow to the wrist, your Honor - or two

24

thirds of the way.

25

THE COURT: Very well.
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1 I
2

Q

(BY MR. COPE)

How long did he have you hand or his

hand on your arm like that?
I

A

I'd say anywhere from two to three seconds.

Q

And what stopped it from being on there?

A

I just twisted away and ran.

Q

You twisted away and ran?

A

Yeah.

Q

And did you hear anything behind you?

What got it

off?

Did you hear

him calling or saying anything to you?
A

Only when he grabbed me.

He was like "Come with me."

But he didn't say nothing after that that I can remember?
Q

Did he ever ask you about having a ride home?

A

Yeah.

Q

What did he say?

A

He said it before.

Yeah, he did.

He said it when, after he asked

me, after he asked me to show me my pee-pee and I was like I
really got to go. And he's like, "Well, do you want a ride
home?"
Q

Okay.

Did you indicate that you wanted a ride home?

A

No.

Q

Did you say that you didn't want a ride home?

A

Yeah.

Q

Did he ever ask you how old you were?

A

Yeah.

I was like, no, I can walk.

54

MR. CORRY:
MR. COPE:
THE COURT:

We'd move to admit Defendant's 6, Judge.
No objection.
Received.

(Defendant's Exhibit 6 received)
Q

(BY MR. CORRY)

He asked you to measure hands. Now,

I'm a little bit confused about this.

Did you understand what

that meant?
A

Yeah.

Q

What did it mean?

A

It just meant put hand and hand and see if it, I

thought it just meant put hand to hand and see whose hand is
bigger?
Q

See whose hand is bigger?

A

Yeah.

Q

You said before you and your friends did that to see

who could palm a basketball that, right?
A

Yeah, we always do that.

Q

Okay.

So, that's what you thought he was basically

doing just seeing whose hand was bigger, right?
A

Yeah.

Q

He walks up to you, like this with his hand out?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

And you say, no, I don't want to measure your

hand.
A

I was like, no, I gotta go.
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11

Q

Okay.

And then he reaches down, right?

2,

A

Yeah,

3

Q

With his other hand.

4

A

No, it was the same.

5

Q

The same hand, reaches down, grabs your hand, right?

6

A

Grabbed mine.

7

Q

Your forearm, right here (inaudible).

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q

Is that right?

10

A

Hold my forearm.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

A little tiny bit above my -

13

Q

Half way up?

14

A

Yeah.

15

Q

Okay. And began to pull it up, correct?

16

A

No, he was just pulling it towards him.

17

Q

Yeah, like this, right?

18

A

Yeah.

19

Q

Okay. And at that point you were scared?

20

A

Well, yeah.

21

Q

Right?

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

The questions before probably made you nervous,

24

right?

25

A

Is that right?

Yeah.

90

1 i

Q

And so now this made you real nervous?

2

A

Yeah.

Q

Right?

3 !

So, as soon as he grabbed your hand you said

i

4 I to yourself, I'm getting out of here.
5 I

A

I'd just -

6 I

Q

Right?

7 I

A

Yeah.

8 1

Q

So you just twisted your arm.

9 J

A

He just, yeah.

10 I

Q

And you took off.

11

A

Yeah.

12

Q

Okay.

13

South?

14

A

Yeah.

15

Q

Is that right?

16 I

A

Yeah.

17 I
18 J

Q
A

Did you look back at all?
Yeah.

19 J

Q

Okay.

20 |

A

I just seen him stand there for a second and then he

i

And you kept running all the way to 17th

i

What did you see when you looked back, Josh?

21 I just turned around and ran towards his motorcycle.
22

Q

Okay.

23

A

Yeah, and we just waited for a second or two.

24
25 i

So, he stood.
And

turned and ran towards his motorcycle.
Q

Okay.

He stood?

91

A

Yeah, he just stood like I was (inaudible) with you

and just turned around towards his motorcycle.
Q

How far away were you when that happened?

How far

down the street were you?
i

A

I'd say a good anywhere from fifteen to twenty feet.

Q

Were you down by (inaudible) by then?

A

I was probably back there, probably at their

driveway.
Q

(inaudible).

A

No, just before the driveway.

Q

Okay.

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay. All right.

So, you're past the two houses?

,
,

That's when he turns and

I

skedaddles toward his motorcycle.

i

A

Yeah.

I

Q

Is that right?

I

A

Yeah.

I

Q

Okay.

Okay, Josh, we'll use a different color, okay? I

This is State's Exhibit 1, we'll use blue ink, okay?

If you

,

could just show the jury, draw on here with a blue pen where

,

you were when you saw him turn and skedaddle back towards the

,

motorcycle.
A

(Witness complies).

Q

Okay. And then he rides off.

A

Yeah.

,
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Q

Right?

And you kept going?

A

Yeah.

Q

You never stopped the whole time?

A

Not that I can remember.

Q

Okay.

A

At 17th South.

Q

Okay.

You got to the intersection, right?

Now there is something I forgot, Josh, I do

this sometimes and I apologize.
important, okay?

It's something that's

So, let me go back to it.

This is right when

he grabs you by the arm.
A

What is?

Q

When he reaches out and he grabs your forearm.

A

Yeah.

Q

And tugs on it?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay?

A

Yeah.

Q

Was it, was that the words?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

And you indicate that he said come with me.

Now this is important, Josh.

Did you tell

that to the policeman who came there that night?
A

Yeah, I did.

Q

You're sure?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

Did you tell that to the detectives that you

93

talked to later?
A

I'm not sure if I told it to the detectives.

Q

It was a long time after.

A

Yeah. A week after.

Q

Okay. All right.

A

Yeah.

Q

And you started down the street.

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay. And one more thing that's just to clarify -

Right?

So then you got to the corner.

And I'm sorry, Judge.
At the time that he said come with me.
to have, make this is clear in my head, okay?
a hard time figuring out what's going on.

I just want

I sometimes have

It was right when he

was holding up his hand and he reached right down to your arm.
Is that right?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay. And then he said come with me?

A

I didn't understand that question.

Q

He said it right as he touched your hand?

remember?
A

Do you

It's okay if you don't.
Just barely after he got a grasp on it or barely,

yeah, I'll say right when he touched my arm.
Q

Okay.

So, it was probably, you were twisting away as

he was saying it?
A

Yeah.
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Q

Okay.

He never followed you, isn't that right?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

Yeah.

Q

Down by 5th East and met up with your parents.

A

Yeah.

Q

Right?

A

No.

Q

Did a motorcycle go past you?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

You were just focused straight ahead?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

And then you went down 17th South.

Okay.

Did you see him again in that time?

Were you looking around for him?

You weren't concerned that he might be coming

behind you?
A

I wasn't really thinking about that.

Q

You weren't?

A

I was just thinking just get somewhere safe.

Q

You were just thinking I'm going home.

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

Q

MR. CORRY:

Judge, if I could just have one second.

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

(BY MR. CORRY)

Now, Josh, you weren't bruised from

